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Abstract 
Recently, I had a very interesting friendly e-mail discussion with Professor Parikh on vagueness 
and fuzzy logic. Pa&h published several papers concerning the notion of vagueness. They 
contain critical remarks on fuzzy logic and its ability to formalize reasoning under vagueness 
[ 10, 1 11. On the other hand, for some years I have tried to advocate fuzzy logic (in the narrow 
sense. as Zadeh says, i.e. as formal logical systems formalizing reasoning under vagueness) 
and in particular, to show that such systems (of many-valued logic of a certain kind) offer a 
fully fledged and extremely interesting logic [4,5]. But this leaves open the question of intuitive 
adequacy of many-valued logic as a logic of vagueness. Below 1 shall try to isolate eight 
questions Parikh asks, add two more and to comment on all of them. Finally, I formulate a 
problem on truth (in)definability in tukasiewicz logic which shows, m my opinion, that fuzzy 
logic is not just “applied logic” but rather belongs to systems commonly called “philosophical 
logic” like modal logics, etc. @ 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
AMS clms$cation: 03B50; 03B52 
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1. Ten questions 
Before starting, let us quote from Par&h’s [lo]. He refers on a test where students 
assigned a numerical value to 10 questions, among them the question “is President de 
Klerk an African?“. He says: “If fuzzy logic says that there is an x such that President 
de Klerk is x-African, then it must tell us how to measure .Y and how to resolve the 
conflict between a person who says that de Klerk is O.&African and another that hc 
is 0.2-African. It must also tell us how the correct value x is related to these two 
conflicting reports and what it n7eanS to way that x is the correct value. If fuzzy logic 
does not answer these questions then its interest is only as a piece of pure mathematics 
and it must be judged by the same requirements of elegance and non-triviality, by which 
016%0072/99/$ ~ see front matter @ 1999 Elscvier Science B V. All rights reserved. 
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the rest of pure mathematics is judged”. We shall comment on this quotation at the 
end of the present section. 
Question 1: In which contexts do use use vague predicates? 
There may be several, but I am fascinated just by one: We speak of a variable 
(real-valued or other) as if it were a binary property. We say “the soup is hot” and, 
mutatis mutandis, this is related to the present temperature of the soup. Surely we are 
not interested in the exact temperature of the soup; but sometimes we are ready to 
assert the above sentence with more stress and at another time with less stress (and at 
another time we are not willing to assert it at all). This is apparent when we ask: “is 
the soup hot”? One can imagine plenty of possible answers, like “Oh yes, very much”, 
“more or less”, “not so much’, etc. A similar case is if we have examples of colours 
(small coloured squares, each with the corresponding adjective: blue, green, etc.). We 
get a new example and are asked: what colour is this? We may reduce this to the 
previous case by supposing some (unconscious) similarity measure; we take the most 
similar example and say: the new colour is (more or less) blue. 
Question 2: What properties of vague predicates are important? 
In my opinion, the most important property is the comparative character: they may 
apply to a given object (individual) more or less (including absolutely yes and ab- 
solutely no). This leads to a comparative notion qf truth: propositions may be more 
or less true. The same proposition (e.g. about soup) can have various truth values in 
various situations: it can be absolutely true, absolutely false, or something in between. 
(Now, one may ask if there should be finitely or infinitely many truth values, if they 
are or are not linearly ordered, etc; but let us not discuss this now.) As stressed in 
the Peff-Jetr discussion [6] this is common in sociological questionnaires. I have tried 
to ask philosophers if something of this kind can be found in European philosophy, 
and the answer was rather negative. Then by chance, I encountered the article by 
Martin [8]. The paper is extremely interesting since it concerns comparative notion 
of existence in neoplatonist philosophers (Plotinus). At one place he says “For our 
purposes here, however, the discussion should not restrict itself to existence and its 
direct transformations. There is another rich source of evidence in the concepts that 
Neoplatonists thought to be closely tied to existence. Indeed, the tradition is noto- 
rious in conflating with reality ideas that modern philosophers carefully distinguish: 
necessity, spirituality, moral goodness, beauty, substantiality, etemality, truth (!) - to 
list a few”. 
Martin stresses comparative use of the above ideas in natural language and “the 
fact that the comparatives that express these ideas are clearly associated with scalar 
adjectives”. Even if this quotation does not seem to be a direct support for many- 
valued truth it does seem to document relatedness of the comparative notion of truth 
to Neoplatonist approach. For a non-philosopher (as the present author) it is just 
pleasing. 
Mathematically, it is important that Tarski’s truth definition immediately gener- 
alizes to many-valued predicate logic: given a structure L (lattice, possibly with 
additional operations) of truth values, one takes a crisp domain and interprets each 
predicate P by an L-valued relation rp. The satisfaction of atomic formulas gencral- 
izcs immediately: The truth value of a formula P(s, . x) in an L-structure M under 
the evaluation ~3 of object variables is the value Y,]( z.(.Y), . , c( ~3)). As some philoso- 
phers helped me to see, this is related to what they like to call the “dequotation 
scheme” (the sentence “it’s snowing” is true iff it’s snowing): the truth value of “John 
is tall” is the result of applying the characteristic function of tallness to the object 
called John. 
Question 3: HON. are truth Jirnctions wluted tc! connrc.ti~~es? 
Thus, what arc the intuitive assumptions we find obligatory or desirable for any truth- 
functional many-valued logic and what is the corresponding mathematical apparatus’! 
‘There arc some sine yzru nons: They must behave classically for extremal values ( I -~~ 
certainly yes, 0 - certainly no). Thus, it is estrenwi~~ questionable if somebody takes 
minimum for the truth function of implication (as is frequent in popular descriptions 
of fuzzy control). Then there arc some natural monotonicity assumptions: conjunction 
should be non-decreasing in either argument; implication should be non-increasing in 
the first and non-decreasing in the second argument. What else? My suggestion is: to 
take the real interval [O,l] for truth values to take a (continuous) t-norm for the truth 
function of the (basic, starting) conjunction, to take its residuum for the truth function 
of implication. (Then modus ponens behaves smoothly with respect to partial truth.) 
Define negation of cp as cp + 0. This gives a nice propositional calculus. My axiom 
system BL covers this. More than that: The theory of t-norms shows that there are 
just three fundamental t-norms: tukasiewicz (max(_y + y - l,O)), @de1 (minimum) 
and product. ’ Every other continuous t-norm is either isomorphic to one of them 
or is “composed” from copies of them ([9], see also e.g. my book [5]). More than 
that: each such logic defines both minimum and maximum. 1 think that one can shou 
examples from natural language of a non-idempotent use of “and”; I wonder if one can 
find examples distinguishing between nilpotent “and” and strict “and”. But before we 
make any linguistic investigations we know what mathematical possibilities we have. 
(When 1 wrote something similar to Parikh. he replied “I do not disagree with this”. 
What a fascinating example of a non-extrcmal truth value!) Very important: One has 
to understand what a compound formula (conjunction) says: as written in the Dialogue 
[6]. if your truth function of conjunction is minimum then the truth degree of (p A, $ 
just tells the minimum of the truth degrees of cp, $. If you take another truth function 
then clearly the truth degree of the formula tells another constraint-incidentally, the 
situation with (classical) quantifiers is simpler since it is always the case that Y is 
interpreted as inf and 3 as sup.’ 
’ This termmology (common in fuzzy logic) is well supponed if one takes mto consideratiws 
the corresponding Implications (residua): one gets tukasiewicr implication (I + .I’) = I for Y c I. 
(H =+ J.) = I - T + J’ otherwise, cf. [7], and Giidel implication or =+ 1’) = I for r<~., .x =s- 1.1 = I oth- 
erw?se. cf. [3]. 
’ There are some alternative definitions of the semantics of quantiliers but we shall not discuss them 
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Question 4: What are the limitations? 
I mean: what are the limitations of the truth-functional fuzzy logic? My main concern 
is: fuzzy logic is not poor man’s probability: it is not a theory of belief into something 
which is crisp by itself. Here I must ask about Par&h’s de Klerk example [lo]. What 
did the test students do? How were they instructed? Was “be an African” interpreted 
as a vague notion, so that the question is how much it is true that de Klerk is an 
African OY as a thing which is either true or false but the precise definition is unknown 
so that the question is how much I believe (bet, find probable) that de Klerk satisfies 
this (unknown but precise) definition? The former is fuzziness, the latter beliefs. And 
the fact that beliefs are not truth functional is notoriously known: For crisp properties 
q, $, the probability P( cp A $) of 40 A $ is not a function of P(q),P($). Similarly for 
possibility II( cp A $). Furthermore, P( q V II/) is not a function of P( cp), P( $); similarly 
for necessity N(cp V $). (For example if P(q) = P($) = 0.5 then P(cp A $) can be any 
number from [0, I].) I always add: fuzziness does not concern beliefs on crisp things 
but, of course, we may make fuzzy statements on probabilities, e.g. saying that the 
probability of something is high. 
Question 5: What is true? 
Formally, we have to reply as in classical logic: true in which interpretation of 
the language? Formulas are not just true or false; their truth value depends on the 
interpretation chosen (model, relational structure). In fuzzy logic, the question is, what 
is the truth degree of a given formula in a given fuzzy structure (described above). 
Now, how does this relate to natural language? Is there something like the “real” 
interpretation (actual possible world)? This question is asked about the classical logic 
and about the fuzzy logic as well - and for both the answer is outside the scope of 
logic. Where are fuzzy structures from? We may reject the question saying that the 
similar question, where are crisp structures from, would have to be asked also. But I 
think that the following approach may be helpful: The “reality” (just starting structure) 
is crisp of the form (M, fi , . . , fn) w h ere each f I maps some power M” into a domain 
Di. We are not interested in crisp values, but have, for each i, a fuzzy subset p, of 
Di (e.g. ,ul is the fuzzy subset of big elements of D,). Thus, in fact, we want to 
refer to the derived structure (M, q, . .) where TV = p;(fi(X)). This structure is our 
interpretation of the predicate language of our fuzzy logic. Truth degrees of formulas 
are defined. 
Question 6: What are we enabled to say? 
First of all, where have I got the LL’S? Am I free to take any fuzzy subset? In my 
opinion, we may assume (for the sake of modelling how we assert something) that 
such fuzzy p’s (meaning of “big table”, “enough money for me to spend today”), etc., 
are somehow in my head (brain). Not that I can be conscious about the values; but in 
some sense as an oracle. I think that this is similar to subjective probabilities. I cannot 
say: “my subjective probability that I shall survive till tomorrow is 0.987654321”, but 
I can say “my subjective probability of that I shall survive till tomorrow is rather 
big”. Given this, I am entitled to say things that are as true as possible, sufficiently 
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true. This is again fuzzy, but the life is fuzzy. Please understand me properly: this is 
surely not advocating that we may say half-truths, cheat, etc. But if John says to Mary 
“I love you” and he says this as the best expression of what he indeed feels, i.e. he 
is fully honest, cannot you imagine a slightly different situation in which his sentence 
would be still more true? Again by the way: if he says “I love you, and I love you, 
and I love you”, I guess that his truth function of “and” is non-idempotent (even if he 
does not care about that). 
Admittedly, there are very few papers attempting to present some observation-based 
foundation to membership functions (Paris’s [12] is one of them). Such analyses are 
clearly interesting but I find the “oracle” approach viable. 
Question I: How do we communicate? 
Honestly: I do not know. This question surely does not concern logic. My primitive 
picture is: When speaking with you, first it is not clear if we speak about the same 
(basic, crisp) model. But I suppose we intend to do that, so let us suppose we do. 
Second, it is to be expected that my and your use of fuzzy words “heavy” is not the 
same (as Parikh repeatedly stresses); but I think that there are some principles that 
we share (I assume that it is not the case that you consider people of even height 
in cm to be big and those of odd height not big). Thus, 1 (very fuzzily) imagine a 
conversation as a game (Pa&h’s word) in which both my and your meaning of fuzzy 
words may change: the cooperative conversation may (possibly) be imagined as a kind 
of tuning the characteristic functions of fuzzy sets involved. By the way, tuning the 
characteristic functions is a very important part of building a fuzzy controller: here 
the good semantics is that which makes the controller to behave well. To use Parikh’s 
example: we have a pot that I think is blue and my wife thinks it is rather green. 
Definitely, this has changed my understanding of blue and green: I have to accept that 
the colour of the pot is green in some not too small positive degree (since my wife 
has called it green). 
Question 8: Is fuzzy logic help&l with the Sorites paradox? 
I think it is: the truth degree of being bald gradually changes from 1 to 0. But one 
has to be careful: One has to work with Iukasiewicz implication (given by a nilpotent 
conjunction) and its Pavelka-style extension. Then a theory assuming that 
- [having 10000 hairs implies not being bald] is absolutely true, 
- [having 0 hairs implies being bald] is absolutely true and 
- [loosing one hair does not make a non-bald man bald] is 0.9999-true 
is consistent (modulo some obvious formalization). 
Vopenka’s alternative set theory deserves mention here: This is, as I have often 
stressed, a completely different approach, Boolean (two-valued), but with restricted 
induction. The interested reader may consult [14]. 
Question 9: How do we make decisions? 
I consider this question to be a promising research program (and have no satisfactory 
answer). First, note that the principle of fuzzy control may be viewed as a possible 
model of decision making under vagueness. Second, there exists literature on decision 
making under fuzziness that is hoped to be helpful in answering the present question. 
For a very informative survey see [2] and references thereof. See also Chapter 12 of 
[ 161. Note Parikh’s [ 1 I] where he analyses vagueness by means of utility theory. 
We cannot escape the fact that different people assign different truth values to the 
same proposition. We do gain a comparative theory of truth. I stress “comparative”, 
not numerical: the semantics is over arbitrary regular residuated lattices (called also 
BL-rr/grhrrr.r) and it is a mathematical result that, for all three famous propositional 
logics. tautologies over all corresponding lattices ’ equal to tautologies over just one 
lattice, namely that of truth values over [O,l]. As an example let us make it precise 
for tukasiewicz propositional logic. The corresponding class of algebras is that of 
MV-algebras: Each MV-algebra can be taken as the truth set of Lukasiewicz logic; 
not each M/-algebra is linearly ordered. The standard MV-algebra is the real interval 
[O. I] with the truth functions of tukasiewicz logic. The completeness theorem says 
that the following three things are mutually equivalent, for each formula cp: (i) cp is 
provable in Lukasiewicz logic, (ii) cp is a tautology over each MV-algebra L, i.e. has 
value 1 under each evaluation of propositional variables by elements of L, (iii) cp is a 
tautology over the standard MV-algebra. Similar completeness theorems hold for Godel 
logic and product logic. For prcdicatc catcuti the situation is more delicate; we do not 
go into details here. 
What is a comparative theory of truth good for? (Besides being beautiful mathemat- 
ics.) Who knows? In the next section, we shall discuss the problem of (un)definability 
of (possibly many-valued) truth predicate in arithmetic developed inside fuzzy logic. 
The problem seems very natural and, in my opinion, illustrates well the fact that fuzzy 
logic is not just some “applied logic” but may bring new light to classical logical prob- 
lcms and thus may be well classified as “philosophical logic” similarly as modal logics, 
etc. On the other hand. ~LIZZ~ logic does have applications. What can be expected from 
our theoretical analysis’? Fuzzy control people should learn to express themselves in a 
logically educated way and stop speaking logical nonsense. Linguists are not interested 
in truth (J was told) but are interested in vagueness; they might find something from 
fuzzy semantics useful. No doubt, fuzzy logic in the broad sense is rather popular; we 
logicians can offer it exact foundations. 
Admittedly, there have been numerous other summaries of fuzzy logic. Ours has 
been written from the perspective of fully developed formal mathematical (symbolic) 
systems of fuzzy logic 151. We do have satisfactory foundations and fuzzy logic stands 
welt the “request of elegance and non-triviality”. On the other hand, our answers should 
’ We mean lattices making all axioms of that logic true. 
show that systems of symbolic many-valued logic discussed here are not only intcr- 
csting fully fledged forma1 systems but serve as reasonable formalization of deduction 
under vagueness. I hope to have shown that the truth value of a formula (atomic like 
“de Klcrk is an African” or compound) is given by an interpwtutkm (modei) of the 
language in question plus by Tarski-like truth definition exactly as in classical logic; 
and that overcoming disagreement of two (or more) persons on the truth value of a 
formula may be well understood as mutual smooth t~irzg their (personal, subjective ) 
interpretations, The underlying “reality” (if any) may be cvcn thought to bc crisp. as 
we have indicated. Particular precise (“correct”) truth values arc of lesser importance: 
what matters arc various monotonicities, shapes of characteristic functions of fuzzy 
sets used. just the comparative characteristics, and the fact that deduction is truth prc- 
serving: given bounds for truth degrees of axioms it gives bounds for truth dcgrccs ot 
conclusions. ’ Thus, in my opinion Parikh’s demands (quoted above) have to be taken 
~‘MH (jr-trrro .~/i.s. The main intuitive appeal of Fuzzy logic is. to repeat once more. in 
its c~/~r~~/r~lti~.~~ twtion of tush. Needless to say, Parikh’s criticism has been cxtrcmeiy 
inspiring and I am grateful for it. 
2. The problem of undefinability of truth 
Let PA be Peano arithmetic with successor, addition, multiplication, zero. equality. 
(USC predicates S, 4. B to represent successor, addition and multiplication. ) Axioms: 
Robinson’s arithmetic (e.g. A(s, 6,x)) plus induction: 
___ - 
Numerals arc constants /i. axioms on them are: S(6. ] ). . S(k - 1, k), WC use Godel 
numbering ~~ formulas are numbers. Extend PA by a unary predicate 7-r and postulate 
the “dequotation schema”: 
for each closed formula (p. The resulting theory TR is contradictory due to the 1ra1 
paradox: using Godel’s diagonal lemma, let i be such that TR t i s -7’rci). Then 
TR ;- i E 1~ which is inconsistent (in Boolean logic). 
Our problem is: What happens in many-valued logic? We may express the condition 
that a predicate is crisp as follows: 
Postulate Crisp(A) and analogously Cr@( =). Crisp(S). Cr@( B). PAL is the theory 
over Cukasiewicz predicate logic Lb with the above crispness axioms and axioms 
of PA. 
’ Let US stress O~VX more that the structure of ttuth values need not be the real unit intenal but may bc 
i&n from 3 broad family of lattices with addttional operations. 
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Fact. PAL (over LV) is equivalent o PA (over Boolean logic). 
Now, extend PAL by a new predicate Tr and by axioms of TR (induction for 
formulas containing Tr, the dequotation scheme). This is TRL 
Problem. Is TRL consistent? 
Remark. The construction of ,J. and the proof of il z -4 goes through. 
Fact. (1) In each model, 2 has the truth degree i. Something very similar was known 
to Skolem [13]: He considered unrestricted comprehension axiom in Lukasiewicz 
logic. Remarkably enough, Zadeh discussed the liar’s formula in his [15] (at a general 
level, not related to arithmetic) and also showed that the formula must have truth 
value i. 
(2) Moreover, for each rational r there is a formula having the value r in each 
model of TRL. 
Remark. T is inconsistent if T F (p&l(p. If T is inconsistent then T proves each 
formula. T is consistent iff T has a model; but (caution) unprovability of cp in T does 
not imply consistency of T,-cp. 
I find this to be a exciting problem. ’ Note that the use of Iukasiewicz logic is 
crucial; over other important logics (Godel logic, product logic) the corresponding 
theory is inconsistent since 1 E 4. is refutable in them. 
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